Eliciting Expertise without Verification by Kong, Yuqing & Schoenebeck, Grant
Eliciting Expertise without Verification
Yuqing Kong
University of Michigan
Grant Schoenebeck
University of Michigan
Abstract
A central question 1 of crowdsourcing is how to elicit expertise from agents. This is even
more difficult when answers cannot be directly verified. A key challenge is that sophisticated
agents may strategically withhold effort or information when they believe their payoff will be
based upon comparison with other agents whose reports will likely omit this information due to
lack of effort or expertise.
Our work defines a natural model for this setting based on the assumption that more
sophisticated agents know the beliefs of less sophisticated agents.
We then provide a mechanism design framework for this setting. From this framework,
we design several novel mechanisms, for both the single and multiple tasks settings, that (1)
encourage agents to invest effort and provide their information honestly; (2) output a correct
“hierarchy” of the information when agents are rational.
1 Introduction
Crowdsourcing, outsourcing tasks to a crowd of workers (e.g. Amazon Mechanical Turk, peer grading
for massive open online courses, scholarly peer review, and Yahoo answers), is a fast, cheap, and
effective method for performing simple tasks even at large scales. To attract a large number of
workers, crowdsourcing is usually open to the public rather than just professional experts. This
makes crowdsourcing a challenge for more complicated tasks where agents with different levels of
expertise may honestly report different answers. For example, in peer grading, some students may
be incapable of accurate grading, missing errors other students point out.
One solution is to spot-check random tasks or equivalently to insert “gold-standard” tasks to
which the mechanism already knows the answer. However, such techniques are expensive and even
impossible for tasks where the agents’ opinions can be very subjective (e.g. peer grading essay
assignments) or individualized (e.g. experience at a restaurant).
1.1 Our setting
This work is about the “peer-prediction” setting where such verification is unavailable or undesirable.
Already, a large line of work in the peer prediction (PP) area [20, 40, 33, 19, 37, 21, 34, 42, 41, 18,
6, 32, 35, 43, 8, 31, 13, 16, 14, 15, 17, 22, 12, 27, 28, 3, 29, 23, 24] designed mechanisms for agents
with similar expertise (without verification).
These papers study various settings. In the single-task setting [27, 29] agents are asked one
multiple-choice question but typically share a common prior over the responses; in the multi-tasks
setting [6, 20, 37] agents are assigned a batch of a priori similar multiple-choice questions. We
consider both of these settings.
1This work is supported by the National Science Foundation, under grant CAREER#1452915, CCF#1618187 and
AitF#1535912.
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In the detail-free setting, the mechanism is not required to know information about the (common)
prior distribution. Our mechanisms are generally in this setting, but some of them do require
information about the different levels of expertise/effort agents can exhibit.
However, the aforementioned peer-prediction papers do not consider settings where
1. Agents have different levels of expertise or
2. A lack of effort can systemically bias agents’ reports.
The following two tasks exemplify settings 1) and 2) respectively:
Example 1.1. Which state (from a list of all 50 states) in the United States of America is closest
to Africa? (Single-task)
Example 1.2. Peer grading several essays by providing a grade from the set {1,2,3,4,5}. (Multi-
tasks)
In the first example, an agent can guess randomly (no effort), look up the correct answer (full
effort), or guess at the correct answer (partial effort). Most people will guess Florida, even though
experts will know the correct answer is Maine. Thus differing levels of expertise yield different
answers.
In the second example, a student can, instead of carefully grading (full effort) or assigning a
random grade (zero effort), quickly check the name of the top of the paper and spot check the
grammar (partial effort). Thus partial effort can systematically bias agents: consider an essay from
a top student in an impeccable pose, but which contains large conceptual errors. Here partial effort
can give some information about the correct answer, but also enable agents to “coordinate” on an
incorrect answer.
Gao, Wright, and Leyton-Brown [9] show that the effects of the settings 1) and 2) are devastating
to previous peer-prediction mechanisms, which generally fail in motivating the agents to invest effort
for “expensive signals” when “cheap signals” (that ensure agreement and may even be correlated with
the sought signal) exist. The main (very high-level) idea behind previous peer-prediction mechanisms
can be understood as a “clever majority vote”, every agent is paid according to a specific similarity
between her and her peer. Thus, they point out that in the peer-grading example, coordinating on
just checking the grammar can guarantee good agreement with other agents, but with substantially
reduced effort.
In fact, Gao et al point out that things are likely even worse than this. If the cheap signals
correlate more than the expensive signals, then the peer-prediction techniques incentivize agents to
not report the true answer, but instead focus on cheap signals! For example, in the essay grading
above, it is likely that assessments of grammatical correctness will agree more than assessments
of overall essay quality. Because of this, peer-prediction mechanisms will pay agents more overall
for lower-quality information. In Example 1.1, even if agents know the answer is Maine, they may
report Florida, expecting that most others will do likewise.
Such behavior undermines the goal of applying crowdsourcing to increasingly complex tasks,
and, in fact, undercuts any application of crowdsourcing to perform any task where the answers
are not “common knowledge." The field must overcome this key challenge of rewarding rather than
suppressing expertise in order to begin the project of expanding crowdsourcing beyond simple
labeling tasks.
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1.2 Key Insight and Assumption
Previous peer-prediction mechanisms treat all information (cheap/expensive) equally, and thus
agents lack an incentive to invest the effort to obtain expensive signals. Moreover, even when an
expert can easily obtain the expensive signal, the previous mechanism discourage her from providing
it when she believes the non-experts will disagree.
A successful mechanism must break the symmetry between weak and expensive signals and
between expert and non-expert signals. We propose the following natural assumption which will
allow a mechanism to break this symmetry.
Assumption 1.3. Agents with high effort or expertise know the beliefs of agents with less effort or
less expertise.
We can see that this assumption is very natural in Example 1.1 and Example 1.2. Agents who
look up or know the answer in Example 1.1 also know most people will answer “Florida.” Agents
that carefully grade an essay can also approximate the score of an agent who spends very little effort.
We will define a hierarchical information structure (Section 3) to naturally capture Assumption 1.3.
Our mechanisms solicit not only agents’ own opinions but also their predictions for the opinions of
the other agents who have less information. This differs with the previous peer prediction mechanisms
which ask agents to provide their predictions for all other agents’ opinions. For example, in the
peer-grading example, we might ask agents to report their own evaluation, and to optionally report
one or more low-effort / low expertise evaluations (e.g. scores based on grammar, thesis statement,
student name, naive reading, etc).
1.3 Our contribution
Modeling: We define a hierarchical information structure (the higher level information is more
valuable and harder to obtain) model that captures the hierarchical relationship between the
different expertise;
Mechanism design: We employ information theory tools to provide a mechanism design frame-
work for the aforementioned hierarchical setting—Hierarchical Mutual Information Paradigm
(HMIP)—which 1) pays the higher level information more and encourages agents to invest
effort for different levels of information according to their own abilities 2) incentivizes agents
to report honestly; and 3) only pays agents for information they actually learn. We apply our
mechanism design framework to create the following mechanisms:
Multi-HMIM which works in the multi-task setting even for a small number of tasks but
requires the mechanism to know the hierarchical information structure.
Learning-based Multi-HMIM which works in the multi-task setting even when the mech-
anism does not know the hierarchical information structure; however requires a large
number of tasks.
Single-HMIM which works in the single-task setting.
Algorithmic: In the multiple task setting where the mechanism does not know the hierarchical
information structure, we design an algorithm which, given agent reports as input, outputs the
hierarchical structure of the information as well as the most valuable information. Note that our
algorithm is robust against agents with limited (or no) information reporting biased (or totally
random and useless) information. This is used as part of the Learning-based Multi-HMIM
mechanism.
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1.4 Road Map
The remainder of this section discusses related work; Section 2 lays out the mathematical tools we
use and can be referred back to when necessary. Section 3 introduces both our model, the hierarchical
information structure, and our mechanism design framework, the hierarchical mutual information
paradigm (HMIP). Section 4 and section 5 apply the HMIP mechanism design framework into
multi-task setting and single-task setting respectively.
In the multi-task setting (Section 4), we consider two situations: 1) the mechanism knows the
information structure shared by agents but each agent is assigned a small number of tasks; 2) the
mechanism does not know the information structure but each agent is assigned a large number
of tasks such that the mechanism can learn the information structure. In the single-task setting
(Section 5), we assume the mechanism know the information structure.
Section 6 concludes by discussing some potential applications and the robustness of our mecha-
nisms.
1.5 Related Work
Model perspective Prior work has modeled heterogeneous expertise where different agents receive
a different number of signals [12] or expertise is embedding in several dimensions [7, 44, 38, 26];
however in these works lower expertise/effort along with a certain dimension only leads to a more
noisy signal. In contrast, our model allows such signals to be systematically biased.
Mechanism design perspective The most related work with the current paper is Prelec et al.
[30] which uses Bayesian Truth Serum [29] to incentivize agents to report their signal and selects the
most surprising signal (measured by occurring more than its average prediction) as the final answer.
McCoy and Prelec [26] follow Prelec et al. [30] to propose a probabilistic model to learn the expertise
of agents. Riley [36] compares the peer prediction decision rule (similar to Prelec et al. [30]) and the
majority vote rule and exhibits cases where each outperforms the other. The current paper differs
with Prelec et al. [30] in the model and assumptions as well as the possible applications. Prelec et al.
[30] only focus on the single-task setting and assume that agents receive the signals endogenously
(without effort). In contrast, this paper considers both single and multiple task settings and the
model used in this paper handles both exogenous and indigenous signals.
The mechanism design framework in the current paper extends the information theoretic frame-
work proposed in Kong and Schoenebeck [20]. Agarwal et al. [1] propose a mechanism that works
for the heterogeneous participants in the multi-task setting. Mandal et al. [25] consider the setting
with heterogeneous tasks. They all do not assume the hierarchy of the information and cannot be
applied to identify and elicit expertise.
Algorithmic perspective Several works [44, 7, 38, 10] provide clever methods to learn the
expertise as well as the ground truth of the crowdsourcing tasks. The algorithm in the current
paper differs in two main aspects: (1) The current paper uses a different expertise model which can
successfully capture the possibly hierarchical relationship between different information/expertise
as well as the most valuable information; (2) the current paper combines the algorithm with an
incentive mechanism that endogenously controls the quality and structure of the input, rather than
making exogenous assumptions about the quality of the input.
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2 Mechanism Design Tools
We use two key information theory ingredients in designing information elicitation mechanisms.
The first ingredient is f -mutual information MIf(X;Y ) which measures the amount of information
crossing two random variables X,Y . For example, if X is independent with Y—no information
crosses X and Y , MIf(X;Y ) = 0. The second ingredient is proper scoring rule PS(x,p) which
measures the accuracy of the prediction p even we only have one sample x of the outcome X.
Both two ingredients have the information monotonicity property. If the information is measured
by f -mutual information, any “data processing” on either of the random variables will decrease the
amount of information crossing them. If the accuracy of a forecast is measured by a proper scoring
rule, more information implies a more accurate forecast.
2.1 f-mutual information
f -divergence [2, 5] Df ∶ ∆Σ × ∆Σ → R is a non-symmetric measure of the difference between
distribution p ∈ ∆Σ and distribution q ∈ ∆Σ and is defined to be Df(p,q) ∶= ∑σ∈Σ p(σ)f (q(σ)p(σ))
where f(⋅) is a convex function and f(1) = 0. Two commonly used f -divergences are KL divergence
and total variation distance. Now we start to introduce f -mutual information.
Given two random variables X,Y , let UX,Y and VX,Y be two probability measures where UX,Y
is the joint distribution of (X,Y ) and V is the product of the marginal distributions of X and Y .
Formally, for every pair of (x, y),
UX,Y (X = x,Y = y) = Pr[X = x,Y = y] VX,Y (X = x,Y = y) = Pr[X = x]Pr[Y = y].
If UX,Y is very different with VX,Y , the mutual information between X and Y should be high
since knowing X changes the belief for Y a lot. If UX,Y equals to VX,Y , the mutual information
between X and Y should be zero since X is independent with Y . Intuitively, the “distance” between
UX,Y and VX,Y represents the mutual information between them.
Definition 2.1 (f -mutual information [20]). The f -mutual information between X and Y is defined
as
MIf(X;Y ) =Df(UX,Y ,VX,Y )
where Df is f -divergence.
Definition 2.2 (Conditional f -mutual information [20]). Given three random variables X,Y,Z, we
define MIf(X;Y ∣Z) as ∑
z
Pr[Z = z]MIf(X;Y ∣Z = z)
where MIf(X;Y ∣Z = z) ∶=MIf(X ′;Y ′) where Pr[X ′ = x,Y ′ = y] = Pr[X = x,Y = y∣Z = z].
Two examples of f -mutual information are Shannon mutual information [4] (Choosing f -
divergence as KL divergence) and MItvd(X;Y ) ∶= ∑x,y ∣Pr[X = x,Y = y] − Pr[X = x]Pr[Y = y]∣
(Choosing f -divergence as Total Variation Distance).
Lemma 2.3 (General data processing inequality / Information monotonicity [20]). When f is convex,
f -mutual information MIf is symmetric MIf(X;Y ) =MIf(Y ;X); non-negative and satisfies data
processing equality: for any transition probability M ∈ R∣ΣX ∣×∣ΣX ∣, when Y is independent with M(X)
conditioning on X, MIf(M(X);Y ) ≤MIf(X;Y ).
In addition to the above lemma, f -mutual information also satisfies the convexity defined
following.
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Lemma 2.4 (Convexity of f -mutual information [20]). Let X1,X2,X,Y,Z,Bλ be random variables
such that X = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩X1 Bλ = 1X2 Bλ = 0 where Bλ is a Bernoulli variable that is independent of X0,X1, Y,Z,
then
MIf(X;Y ) ≤ λMIf(X1;Y ) + (1 − λ)MIf(X2;Y ).
2.2 Proper scoring rules
Informally, a scoring rule measures the accuracy of the forecasts. Formally, a scoring rule [39, 11]
PS ∶ Σ ×∆Σ → R takes in a signal x ∈ Σ and a distribution over signals δΣ ∈ ∆Σ and outputs a real
number. A scoring rule is proper if, whenever the first input is drawn from a distribution δΣ, then
δΣ will maximize the expectation of PS over all possible inputs in ∆Σ to the second coordinate. A
scoring rule is called strictly proper if this maximum is unique. We will assume throughout that the
scoring rules we use are strictly proper. Slightly abusing notation, we can extend a scoring rule to
be PS ∶ ∆Σ ×∆Σ → R by simply taking PS(δΣ, δ′Σ) = Ex←δΣ(x, δ′Σ). We note that this means that
any proper scoring rule is linear in the first term.
Example 2.5 (Log Scoring Rule [39, 11]). Fix an outcome space Σ for a signal x. Let q ∈ ∆Σ be a
reported distribution. The Logarithmic Scoring Rule maps a signal and reported distribution to a
payoff as follows:
L(x,q) = log(q(x)).
Let the signal x be drawn from some random process with distribution p ∈ ∆Σ.
Then the expected payoff of the Logarithmic Scoring Rule
Ex←p[L(x,q)] =∑
x
p(x) log q(x) = L(p,q)
This value will be maximized if and only if q = p.
Intuitively, more information should imply a more accurate prediction. This intuition is valid when
the accuracy is measured by a proper scoring rule. When predicting a random variable Y , assuming
that all agents have a common prior, the agent who has more information will have higher prediction
score when the prediction score is measured by a proper scoring rule. We denote the prediction of Y
conditioning on X as Pr[Y ∣X] ∶= (Pr[Y = 1∣X],Pr[Y = 2∣X], ...,Pr[Y = ∣Σ∣∣X]) ∈ ∆Σ.
Lemma 2.6 (Information monotonicity of proper scoring rules). Given any strictly proper scoring
rule PS,
EX,Y,ZPS(Y,Pr[Y ∣X,Z]) ≥ EX,Y PS(Y,Pr[Y ∣X]).
The equality holds if and only if Pr[Y ∣X = x,Z = z] = Pr[Y ∣X = x] for all (x, z) where Pr[X = x,Z =
z] > 0.
We defer the proof to the appendix.
3 Model and Mechanism Design Framework
In this section, we will define the hierarchical information structure and provide a mechanism design
framework that helps design mechanisms which elicit the hierarchical information. Section 3.1 defines
the information model; Section 3.2 defines our mechanism framework; and Section 3.3 analyzes the
framework. We will use the peer grading process (Figure 1) as a running example to throughout this
section.
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Figure 1: An illustration of the hierarchical information structure in the peer grading process.
3.1 Hierarchical Information Structure
There are n agents and one task. The agents have a finite set M of methods to perform on the task
based on the task’s attributes a ∈ A where a is a random (possibly high dimensional) vector drawn
from a distribution QA ∈ ∆A. Each method m ∶ A↦ Σm maps the attributes a ∈ A to a signal m(a)
from a finite set Σm. We now introduce our peer grading example.
10 evaluators are asked to judge one essay. The essay has eight possible attributes: a =(qi,wj , lk), i, j, k ∈ {0, 1}. (q1,w0, l1) means the essay has (good quality, bad writing, long length);(q0,w1, l0) means the essay has (bad quality, good writing, short length). The distribution over
the attributes space QA is defined as:
QA((q0,w0,∗)) QA((q0,w1,∗)) QA((q1,w0,∗)) QA((q1,w1,∗))
0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4
With this distribution, an essay of good quality usually has good writing as well. Moreover, we
assume the essay’s length is independent with the essay’s quality and writing and an essay has long
length with probability 0.5. That is: QA((qi,wj , l1)) = QA((qi,wj ,∗)) ∗ 0.5,QA((qi,wj , l0)) =
QA((qi,wj ,∗)) ∗ 0.5.
Each evaluator can perform three methods: ml(a), mw(a), and mq(a) which are, respectively,
(possibly noisy) signals about the essay’s length; writing style and grammar; and quality.
Σl = Σw = Σq = {,,/}.
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We define ψmi (a) as agent i’s received output by performing m on attributes a. Different agents
may receive different signals by performing the same method on the same attributes. But we assume
the distribution is symmetric/homogeneous in the sense that for any permutation pi ∶ [n]↦ [n], the
probability that ψm1 (a) = σ1, ψm2 (a) = σ2, ... ψmn (a) = σn equals the probability that ψmpi(1)(a) = σ1,
ψmpi(2)(a) = σ2, ... ψmpi(n)(a) = σn. We also assume that each agent performs methods independently
(see (1)). When the attributes a is drawn from a distribution QA, we can define define Ψmi as agent
i’s received output by performing m on a random attributes a that is drawn from a distribution
QA. Analogously, we define a random variable Ψm−i as an arbitrary agent j ≠’s received output by
performing m on a random attributes a that is drawn from a distribution QA. This definition is
well-defined since we have assumed the distribution is symmetric. We define prior Q as a joint
distribution over all {Ψmi }i∈[n],m∈M .
Conditioning on the attributes of the essay a = (qi,wj , lk), i, j, k ∈ {0,1}, for each method
m, each agent will receive ψmi (a) = , with probability pm,a independently by performing
m. That is, agents’ received signals by performing m is a Binomial distribution B(n = 10, pm,a). a
good quality essayb bad quality essay
Pr[mq(a) = ,] 70% 30%
This means conditioning on the essay having good quality, the distribution over agents’ received
quality signals by performing mq is Qmq ,(q1,∗,∗) = B(10,0.7); while conditioning on the essay
having good quality, the distribution is Qmq ,(q0,∗,∗) = B(10,0.3). Similarly, we have
good writing essay bad writing essay
Pr[mw(a) = ,] 90% 10%
long essay short essay
Pr[ml(a) = ,] 100% 0%
Note that the cheap length signal is noiseless. We also assume that fixing the attributes, every
agent performs the different methods independently. That is, when a = (q1,w1, l1)
Pr (Ψmli (a) = ,,Ψmwi (a) = ,,Ψmqi (a) = ,) = 0.7 ∗ 0.9 ∗ 1. (1)
With the above set up, the probability that agent i receives a , writing signal and agent j
receives a , quality signal will be
Pr[Ψmwi = ,,Ψmqj = ,] = 0.4 ∗ 0.1 ∗ 0.3 + 0.1 ∗ 0.3 ∗ 0.9 + 0.1 ∗ 0.7 ∗ 0.1 + 0.4 ∗ 0.7 ∗ 0.9 = 0.298.
aTo give a concrete example, we use the Binomial distribution here. In fact, we only need the distribution to
be symmetric.
bThis means a = (q1,∗,∗)
We define a partial order on the methods. We say m1 ⪰m2—the level of m1 is higher than that
of m2—if method m1 cannot be performed without performing m2. By m1 ≻m2 we mean m1 ⪰m2
but m2 /⪰m1. Note that the partial order ≻ is transitive—m1 ≻m2,m2 ≻m3 ⇒m1 ≻m3. Each agent
i needs effort hi(m) > 0 to perform method m and when she spends effort hi(m) to perform m, the
methods that have lower levels than m are performed as well without additional effort. We assume,
as is natural, that hi(m) is an increasing function, that is, hi(m1) ≥ hi(m2) when m1 ⪰ m2. The
higher the level of the method an agent performs, the more effort she must invest. However, it may
be the case that some agents (low cost agents) can perform methods more economically than others
(high cost agents). The partial order definition is essentially our key assumption (Assumption 1.3).
8
mq ≻mw ≻ma. Among the 10 evaluators, there are 2 low cost evaluators who need 1,2,5 effort
to perform ml,mw,mq respectively. There are 8 high cost evaluators who need 1,4,10 effort
to perform ml,mw,mq respectively (Figure 1). Based on the partial order definition, when an
evaluator spends sufficient effort to perform mq and obtains the quality signal, she also obtains
the length and writing signals without additional effort, which is natural in real life.
We assume agents share a hierarchical information structure and allow agents to have different
priors Q2. We will design mechanisms that incentivize agents to invest efforts based on their costs
and report honestly.
3.2 Mechanism Design Framework
We start by introducing the formal definition of a mechanism.
Definition 3.1 (Mechanism). We define a mechanismM for n agents as a tupleM ∶= (R,S) where
R is a set of all possible reports the mechanism allows, and S ∶ Rn ↦ Rn is a mapping from all
agents’ reports to each agent’s payment.
We will extend the Mutual Information Paradigm [20] to our Hierarchical Mutual Information
Paradigm that handles the hierarchical information structure.
Mutual Information Paradigm [20] Kong and Schoenebeck [20] provide a Mutual Information
Paradigm for Peer Prediction Mechanisms: each agent i is paid the mutual information between her
information and her peers’ information—
MI(her information;her peers’ information).
By picking f -mutual information MIf that satisfies data processing equality (Section 2.1), no
agent can obtain strict benefit by lying since intuitively the amount of information each agent has
will not increase no matter what kind of strategy she applies to her information.
We can naturally extend the Mutual Information Paradigm for Peer Prediction Mechanisms to
the hierarchical model by paying agent i
MIf(her information;{Ψm−i}m∈M)3.
This idea has a severe drawback: sometimes low level information has very large correlation
with the high level information. In this case, MIf(her information;{Ψm−i}m∈M) will pay low level
information nearly as much as high level information; and so agents will lack incentive to perform
high level methods.
To solve the above problem, we pay agents method by method. For each m, we only value
the “information gain” in the sense that we pay each agent i the mutual information between her
information and the method m’s information conditioning on the information output by the methods
are lower than m.
Formally, we chose a payment scale αm for each m and pay each agent i∑
m
αmMI
f(her information; Ψm−i∣{Ψm′−i }m′≺m).
In our actual paradigm, we hope to pay each agent i using the above payment when the mechanism
has access to all levels of honest information provided by other agents.
2To ease the presentation of the example, in our peer grading example, we assume agents share the same prior Q.
3Recall that (Ψm1 ,Ψm2 , ...,Ψmn ) are the random signals agents receive by performing method m on the same random
attributes.
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In the peer grading example, the information about the writing style / grammar may already
have a very high correlation with the quality of the essay. With the above concrete set up,
we are ready to calculate the (conditional) Shannon mutual information (Euler number base)
between agent i’s received signals and agent j’s received signals. For example, the 2 × 2 entry is
the mutual information between agent i’s received length signal, writing signal by performing
method mw and agent j’s writing signal, conditioning on agent j’s length signal, which is 0.2259.
We calculate the values by first calculating the joint distribution over 6 random variables—agent
i’s length, writing, quality signals and agent j’s length, writing, quality signals.
We show the values in the following table and defer the calculation to Appendix B. According to
the information monotonicity, for each column, the values increase from bottom to top.
agent i’s
MI(⋅; ⋅) agent j’s
length writing∣length a quality ∣ writing, length length, writing, qualityb
length, writing, quality 0.6931 0.2259 0.0115 0.9305
length, writing 0.6931 0.2218 0.0041 0.9190
length 0.6931 0 0 0.6931
Even though performing the quality method provides the information that has the highest mutual
information 0.9305 with other agents’ information, performing writing method already outputs
information that has 0.9190 ≈ 0.9305 ∗ 0.98 mutual information with other agents’ information.
In this case, what we really value is the additional quality of information after conditioning on
the information of cheap signals like writing style / grammar. In other words, we value the
information about an essay which has a high quality but is written carelessly (or low quality but
impeccable prose).
Each agent, performing the writing method only has 0.0041 mutual information with other
agents’ quality signal conditioning on other agents’ writing and length signals while performing
the quality method has 0.0115 ≈ 0.0041 ∗ 2.80 conditional mutual information.
Looking ahead, we seek to pay each evaluator i by:
αlMI
f(her information;agent j’s length signal) (2)+αwMIf(her information;agent j’s writing signal∣agent j’s length signal)+αqMIf(her information;agent j’s quality signal∣agent j’s length and writing signal).
where αq is set to be rather larger than αl and αw.
ax∣y means x conditioning on y.
bSince we use Shannon mutual information which satisfies chain rule, the last column is the sum of the previous
columns.
Hierarchical Mutual Information Paradigm (HMIP(MIf ,{αm}m)) We now present our
hierarchical Mutual Information Paradigm. We emphasize that this is not a mechanism that can
be run. Instead we engage in the wishful thinking that the reports of the agents are distributions
rather than draws from the distribution. Of course, this will never happen. Nonetheless, we will
show that using the HMIP paradigm we can design actual mechanisms in both the multiple-task
setting (Section 4) and the single-task setting (Section 5).
The paradigm requires as parameters a payment scale αm ∈ R≥0 for each method m.
Report For each agent i, for each m ∈M , she is asked to optionally provide the random signal Ψmi .
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We denote the set of methods whose outputs are reported by agent i as Mi and the actual
random signal she reports for each ` ∈Mi as Ψˆ`i .
Payment/Information Score We define M−i as ⋃j≠iMj . For each m ∈M−i, we arbitrarily pick
an agent j ≠ i who provides method m’s output and denote his report for method m’s output
as Ψˆm−i.
Agent i is paid by her information score∑
m∈M−i αmMI
f({Ψˆ`i}`∈Mi ; Ψˆm−i∣{Ψˆm′−i }m′≺m,m′∈M−i)
Resolving “wishful thinking” HMIP pays agents according to the information measure. The
calculation of the information measure requires the knowledge of the prior, i.e., the joint distribution
which is unrealistic in practice. To resolve this “wishful thinking”, a key observation is that paying
agents an unbiased estimator of the information measure is sufficient when we assume agents are
expected utility maximizers. To construct an unbiased estimator of the information measure using
agents’ reports, different settings have different techniques. In the multi-task setting, either we ask a
large number of questions to estimate the prior and use the prior to calculate the information measure
(Learning-based multi-HMIM), or we ask a small number questions but require the knowledge of the
structure and use a special f -mutual information, MItvd (Multi-HMIM). In the single-task setting
(Single-HMIM), we ask agents their posteriors (e.g. what percentage of your peers say yes?) and
construct the estimator using both the first order information (e.g., Y/N) and the second order
information (e.g., 80% Yes). Thus, although all proposed mechanisms are based on the HMIP, they
are all detail free in the sense that they do not need any priori knowledge of the distributions (nor
wishful thinking).
3.3 Analysis of HMIP
For each agent i, we define her utility as her payment minus her effort.
Definition 3.2 (Strategy). We define the effort strategy of each agent i as a mapping ei from her
priors to a probability distribution over the methods she will perform. We define the report strategy
of each agent i as a mapping si from her received information to a probability distribution over R.
Definition 3.3 (Amount of information in HMIP). In HMIP, for agent i, the amount of information
acquired with method mi is defined as
AOI(mi,HMIP(MIf ,{αm}m)) ∶= ∑
m∈M αmMIf({Ψ`i}`⪯mi ; Ψm−i∣{Ψm′−i }m′≺m).
We have already give the example of the amount of information in (2). Later in the proof of
Theorem 3.7, we will see the amount of information is also the optimal payment of agent i who
performs method mi when HMIP has access to all levels of honest signals reported by other agents.
An especially desirable strategy in HMIP is a prudent strategy. Informally, agents play a prudent
strategy if they (a) choose the method they perform to maximize their utility—trading off the
amount of information acquired with the effort it costs; (b) report all received information honestly.
Definition 3.4 (Prudent strategy in HMIP). For each agent i, we say she plays a prudent strategy
in HMIP(MIf ,{αm}m) if she chooses to (a) perform method m∗i such that
m∗i ∈ arg max
mi
(AOI(mi,HMIP(MIf ,{αm}m)) − hi(mi)) ;and
(b) reports all received information honestly.
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Definition 3.5 (Truthful strategy in HMIP). We say an agent plays truthful strategy if she always
reports her received information honestly.
A truthful strategy is a special report strategy. An agent can play any effort strategy and truthful
strategy simultaneously. If an agent invests no effort and reports nothing or meaningless information,
she is still considered as playing truthful strategy.
Mechanism design goals A mechanism M is (strictly) potent if for each agent, when she
believes everyone else plays their prudent strategy, she can (strictly) maximize her expected utility
by playing a prudent strategy as well. A mechanism M is dominant truthful if for each agent,
regardless of other agents’ strategies, she can maximize her expected utility by playing a pure effort
strategy and truthful strategy.
The dominant truthful property is incomparable with the potent property. A flat payment scheme
is dominant truthful but not potent since investing no effort and reporting nothing is also considered
as a pure effort and truthful strategy. The potent property is desirable since it encourages low cost
agents to invest high level effort and high cost agents to invest low level effort, and incentivizes them
to report honestly as well.
In order to design potent mechanism, the coefficients {αm}m should be chosen appropriately. If
the coefficients {αm}m are too low, no agent will be incentivized to invest the highest level method.
In this case, the mechanism cannot access all levels of information to encourage agents to play
prudent strategy. Thus, we will assume the coefficients are chosen such that it is worthwhile for at
least two agents to invest the highest level method.
We say a method m is maximal if there does not exist m′ ≠m ∈M such that m′ ≻m.
Definition 3.6 (potent coefficients for HMIP). Given the priors {Qm}m, we say the coefficients{αm}m are potent for HMIP(MIf ,{αm}m) if given the coefficients {αm}m, for every maximal m,
there exists at least two agents whose prudent strategy in HMIP(MIf ,{αm}m) is performing method
m.
This is a weak requirement since we only need to set sufficiently high coefficients to incentivize
two low cost agents such that for each agent (including one of the low cost agent), she will believe
there exists a low cost agent who will be incentivized to report all levels of information. potent
coefficients exist since we can always set the coefficient of the highest level information sufficiently
high and the coefficients of other levels arbitrarily close to zero such that agents will be incentivized
to invest the highest level effort. We use our peer grading example to show how to set potent
coefficients. With our example, we will see we can always set the optimal potent coefficients that
minimize the mechanism’s cost by solving a linear programming.
In our example, the 2 low cost agents need efforts 1,2,5 to perform ml,mw,mq respectively and 8
high cost agents need efforts 1,4,10. With the above set up, we need αq ∗ 0.0115 + αw ∗ 0.2259 +
αl ∗ 0.6931 − 5 > max{αq ∗ 0.0041 + αw ∗ 0.2218 + αl ∗ 0.6931 − 2, αl ∗ 0.6931 − 1,0} to make the
coefficients potent and we also want to minimize the mechanism’s cost which is
2 ∗ (αq ∗ 0.0115 + αw ∗ 0.2259 + αl ∗ 0.6931)
+ 8 ∗
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
vq ∶= αq ∗ 0.0115 + αw ∗ 0.2259 + αl ∗ 0.6931 if vq − 10 ≥ vw − 4, vl − 1,0
vw ∶= αq ∗ 0.0041 + αw ∗ 0.2218 + αl ∗ 0.6931 if vw − 4 ≥ vq − 10, vl − 1,0
vl ∶= αl ∗ 0.6931 if vl − 1 ≥ vw − 4, vq − 10,0
0 otherwise
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After solving this linear programming, the optimal solution is around αl, αw, αq =
a,0.5562,423.8571 and the amount of information for performing ml,mw,and mq are O(),
1.86 +O(), and 5 +O() respectively. The minimal cost is 2 ∗ (5 +O()) = 10 +O().
a is an arbitrarily small positive real number, we need  since we want agents will be incentivized to report
the length signal as well.
Theorem 3.7. Given a convex function f , HMIP(MIf ,{αm}m) is dominant truthful; moreover,
when {αm}m are potent for HMIP(MIf ,{αm}m), HMIP(MIf ,{αm}m) is potent and dominant
truthful.
The proof of the theorem uses the information monotonicity of MIf . The key observation in the
proof is that applying any strategy to the information is essentially data processing and thus erodes
information.
Proof for Theorem 3.7. In order to show the dominant truthful property, we will show for each agent,
fixing any other agents’ strategies, she can maximize her payment as well as her utility by reporting
her received information honestly. The information monotonicity property of f -mutual information
MIf (Fact 2.3) says any data processing decreases the (conditional) mutual information. For each
m ∈M−i, fixing the strategies other agents use, the distribution of Ψˆm−i, whose randomness comes
from random variable Ψm−i and the agents’ strategies, is also fixed. Any strategy (data processing)
agent i applies to her received signals decreases
MIf(her received signals; Ψˆm−i∣{Ψˆm′−i }m′≺m,m′∈M−i).
Thus, for agent i, honestly reporting her received signals maximizes her payment no matter what
strategies other agents use.
We start to show HMIP is potent when the coefficients are potent . When the coefficients are
potent , for every agent i, when she believes everyone else plays a prudent strategy, she will believe
for each m, there exists an agent j(m) ≠ i who reports {Ψ`j}`⪯m to the mechanism. Thus, M−i =M .
In this case, agent i’s optimal payment for performing method mi will be∑
m∈M αmMIf({Ψ`i}`⪯mi ; Ψmj ∣{Ψm′j }m′≺m) = ∑m∈M αmMIf({Ψ`i}`⪯mi ; Ψm−i∣{Ψm′−i }m′≺m)
which is the amount of information acquired with method mi (Definition 3.3) and can be obtained by
honestly reporting all received information. The optimality of the payment is due to the information
monotonicity of MIf . In this case, her optimal strategy is her prudent strategy. Therefore, HMIP is
potent .
HMIP provides a framework to design information elicitation mechanisms for our hierarchical
information model. To apply the HMIP framework in different settings, it remains to design the report
requirement for agents and to use agents’ reports to calculate the (conditional) mutual information
without underlying distributions. We apply HMIP in both the multi-task setting (Section 4) and the
single-task setting (Section 5).
4 Multi-task Setting
In this section, we will apply the HMIP framework in the multi-task setting where each agent receives
a random batch of a priori similar tasks.
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4.1 Backgrounds and Assumptions
In multi-task setting, the major challenge solved in previous peer prediction literature is that agents
may “get something for nothing” by always answering the same answer (e.g. always saying good in
peer grading).
In the setting where agents are assigned ≥ 2 tasks, Dasgupta and Ghosh [6], Kong and Schoenebeck
[20], Shnayder et al. [37] solve this challenge by assuming agents are homogeneous and rewarding
agents not only for their agreements but also for the diversity of their answers. If an agent answers the
same answer all the time (no diversity), she will be paid nothing. Kong and Schoenebeck [20] show that
this idea essentially means rewarding each agent MItvd(her information;her peer’s information).
When agents are heterogeneous, Mandal et al. [25] ask agents to answer a sufficient number of
tasks and then classify their answers into different clusters to learn their levels and pay them.
Assumption 4.1 (a priori similar). All tasks are a priori similar for all agents. That is, tasks are
i.i.d samples for all agents. For every agent, before she invests any effort, for each m, for all tasks,
she has the same prior belief for the signals she and other agents will receive by performing m.
Prior work [37, 6, 20] also makes this assumption; however, in their setting, it is much stronger
than in ours. For example, it insists that the only “signal” included in a prompt is for the correct
answer. In reality, some false answers are more appealing than others (see Example 1.1 where
Kansas is an unlikely answer). In our model, these appealing false answers can be modeled as “cheap”
information instead of being assumed away.
Note that in the multi-task setting, we allow agents to have different priors and only require that
for every agent, her prior satisfies our assumptions.
4.2 Known Information Structure and a Small Number of tasks
In order to avoid agents “getting something for nothing” by reporting the cheap signals instead of
the expensive signals (e.g. giving a high quality grade when there are no typos in Example 1.2), we
reward agents the information score of expensive signals according to not only their agreements but
also the diversity of their answers conditioning on the tasks which have the same cheap signals. (e.g.
the essays which all have no typos). We will show this idea is essentially the application of HMIP
framework when MIf is chosen to be MItvd.
Assumption 4.2 (Positively correlated signals). We assume that for every method m, each agent i,
every σ ≠ σ′, every possible {σm′}m′≺m, every subset M ′ ⊂ {m′∣m′ ≺m}, Ψm−i is positively correlated
with Ψmi = σ:
Pr[Ψm−i = σ∣Ψmi = σ] > Pr[Ψm−i = σ],
Pr[Ψm−i = σ∣Ψmi = σ′] < Pr[Ψm−i = σ],
conditioning on {Ψm′−i }m′∈M ′ = {σm′}m′∈M .
Dasgupta and Ghosh [6] and Shnayder et al. [37] both make this assumption as well. It means
that receiving σ by performing m will increase each agent’s belief for how many other agents receive
σ by performing m. It is a substantially weaker assumption than that agents always believe they are
in the majority.
In the peer grading example, this assumption means that for every agent, receiving , for the
quality signal will increase her belief for the probability other agents receive , for the quality
signal.
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Assumption 4.3 (Conditional independence). For each agent i who performs method mi, we assume
that for every possible {σm′}m′≺m, every subset M ′ ⊂ {m′∣m′ ≺m}, for each m ⪯mi, Ψmi contains all
information agent i has that is related to Ψm−i, in other words, conditioning on Ψmi , {Ψm′i }m′⪯mi,m′≠m
are independent with Ψm−i, conditioning on {Ψm′−i }m′∈M ′ = {σm′}m′∈M ′4.
In the peer grading example, this assumption means that for every agent, if she has already
thought the writing is good, her quality signal will not affect her opinion for the writing.
With this assumption, when an agent needs to report her information that is related to Ψm−i,
assuming she has already performed method m, it’s sufficient for her to only report Ψmi .
Multi-task Hierarchical Mutual Information Mechanism (Multi-HMIM({αm}m))
Report Each agent i is assigned a random batch of tasks (at least two). For each task t which is
assigned to agent i, she is asked to report both the method mi(t) she performed on task t
and method mi(t)’s output ψmi(t)i (t); for each m ≠mi(t), agent i is asked to optionally report
her signal ψmi (t). We denote her actual report for her performed method and signal for every
method m by mˆi(t) and ψˆmi (t) respectively.
Information Score For each method m, the mechanism collects agent i’s method m signals and
records them via a T dimensional vector ψˆmi .
The tth coordinate of ψˆmi is
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ψˆmi (t), if agent i provides the
method m’s output ψˆmi (t)
for task t;
∅, otherwise
We define ψˆm−i as a vector where the tth coordinate of ψˆm−i is⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ψˆm−i(t), we arbitrarily pick an agent (who is not agent i)
whose performed method is ⪰m for task t
and provides method’s m’s output for task t;
we denote his report by ψˆm−i(t);
∅, such agent does not exist
Agent i is paid by her information score
∑
m
2αmCorr(ψˆmi ; ψˆm−i∣{ψˆm′−i }m′≺m)
and Corr(⋅)5 is a random algorithm defined in Algorithm 1.
4Note that if agents receive the same signal by performing the same method, both Assumption 4.2 and Assumption 4.3
will hold.
5Corr(⋅; ⋅) is essentially the same concept as the payment schemes in Dasgupta and Ghosh [6], Kong and Schoenebeck
[20], Shnayder et al. [37]. Corr(⋅; ⋅∣⋅) is a new concept in this paper.
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We design Corr(ψˆmi ; ψˆm−i∣{ψˆm′−i }m′≺m) to be an unbiased estimator ofMItvd(Ψˆmi ; Ψˆm−i∣{Ψˆm′−i }m′≺m)6
if Ψˆmi and Ψˆ
m−i are positively correlated. Thus, in Multi-HMIM, agents are essentially paid based on
the (conditional) mutual information by picking a special f -mutual information—MItvd, if agents
are honest since we have assumed that agents’ honest signals are positively correlated. This makes
our Multi-HMIM a special case of HMIP framework.
Definition 4.4 (Amount of information in Multi-HMIM). In Multi-HMIM, when agent i performs
method mi, the amount of information acquired with the effort is defined as
AOI(mi,Multi-HMIM({αm}m)) ∶= ∑
t∈[T ] maxfm∶Π`⪯miΣ`↦Σm αmMI
tvd(fm({Ψ`i}`⪯mi); Ψm−i∣{Ψm′−i }m′≺m).
maxfm∶Π`⪯miΣ`↦Σm means agent i optimize her expected information score over all report strategies
that maps her received signals ({Ψ`i}`⪯mi) to her reported signal for method m.
Like we did in the analysis of HMIP, we need to guarantee that for agent i whose performed
method is mi, the amount of her received information defined by the above definition should be
her optimal payment in Multi-HMIM, given that Multi-HMIM has access to all levels of honest
signals reported by other agents. Note that the building block Corr in our mechanism is an unbiased
estimator of MItvd only if the signals are positively correlated. Thus, in order to make the above
guarantee, we make an additional assumption—positively correlated guess: agents’ optimal guesses
for each method m’s output are positively correlated with m’s real output.
Assumption 4.5 (Positively correlated guess). For agent i whose performed method is mi, for all
m, for all subset M ′ ⊂ {m′∣m′ ≺m}, there exists f∗m,M ′ such that
f∗m,M ′ ∈ arg max
fm∶Π`⪯miΣ`↦ΣmMI
tvd(fm({Ψ`i}`⪯mi); Ψm−i∣{Ψm′−i }m′∈M ′)
and f∗m,M ′({Ψ`i}`⪯mi) is positively correlated with Ψm−i.
Definition 4.6 (Prudent strategy in Multi-HMIM). For each agent i, we say she plays prudent
strategy in Multi-HMIM({αm}m) if she (a) performs method m∗i for all her tasks such that
m∗i = arg max
mi
(AOI(mi,Multi-HMIM({αm}m)) − hi(mi)) ;
(b) reports her method m∗i honestly and reports her all received signals honestly for all her tasks.
Definition 4.7 (Potent coefficients for Multi-HMIM). Given the priors {Qm}m, we say the co-
efficients {αm}m are potent for Multi-HMIM({αm}m) if given the coefficients {αm}m, for every
maximal m, for every task t, among the agents who are assigned task t, there exists at least two
agents whose prudent strategy in Multi-HMIM({αm}m) are performing method m.
Definition 4.8 (Truthful strategy in Multi-HMIM). For each agent i, we say she plays truthful
strategy if for each task t, she honestly report her method mi(t) for task t and for each m ≺mi(t),
either she chooses to not report or she reports honestly.
We allow agents to guess the signals they did not receive. Thus, in the definition of prudent
strategy and truthful strategy, we only require agents to honestly report the signals they receive and
do not put any restriction on their guesses.
6In the current paper, ψˆmi means vector, Ψˆmi means random variable.
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Here we propose a new mechanism design goal: we say a mechanism is (strictly) truthful if for
each agent, when she believes other agents play a truthful strategy, she can (strictly) maximize her
expected utility by playing a truthful strategy.
The truthful property is incomparable with the potent property. A potent mechanism incentivizes
the efforts of agents but it requires agents to believe other agents play prudent strategy. A truthful
mechanism may not be able to incentivize efforts of agents but it incentivizes truthful report by only
requiring agents to believe other agents either report honestly or choose to not report.
Theorem 4.9. With Assumption 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, Multi-HMIM({αm}m) is truthful; moreover, when{αm}m are potent for Multi-HMIM({αm}m), Multi-HMIM({αm}m) is potent and truthful.
In order to show the truth property of Multi-HMIM, we will show for each agent, given that
other agents play truthful strategy, (1) conditioning on using pure effort strategy, she can maximize
her payment as well as her utility by reporting all her received information honestly; (2) pure effort
strategy gives her better utility than mixed effort strategy. We can apply Theorem 3.7 directly
and use the information monotonicity of MItvd to prove part (1) directly. In order to show part
(2), we need to solve the mixed effort strategy problem in the multi-task setting—agents put high
level effort only for a partial number of tasks but claim that they spend high level effort all the
time. Note that even though agents can expend lower effort in randomizing between performing
a low level method and a high level method than purely performing high level method, they also
obtain lower payment since they have less “agreement” with high level information provided by other
people. It turns out that the convexity of the f -mutual information—including MItvd—implies that
agents cannot obtain higher utility—which is the payment minus the cost—by playing a mixed effort
strategy. The potent property immediately follows from the truthful property and the condition
that the coefficients are potent . We defer the formal proof to the appendix.
4.3 Learning Information Structure with a Large Number Tasks
Assumption 4.10 (δ0-gap). For each m, we assume that for every i ≠ j, each m′ ≠m
MIf(Ψmi ; Ψmj ) > 1δ0 MIf(Ψmi ; Ψm′j ) < 1δ0
The above assumption guarantees that when we can accurately learn the f -mutual information
between two agents’ answer vectors, we can accurately classify the answer vectors and then learn the
maximal method’s outputs correctly.
Learning-based Multi-HMIM(L)
Report Each agent i is assigned T tasks and asked to perform the same method for all tasks. For
agent i who performs method mi, she is asked to report her own answer vector
ψmii = (ψmii (1), ψmii (2), ..., ψmii (T ))
and, for each method m ≠mi, is asked to optionally report her answer vector ψmi . We denote
the set of methods whose outputs are reported by agent i as Mi and the actual answer vector
she reports for each method ` ∈Mi as ψˆ`i . Agent i can name the methods freely7.
7The mechanism will ignore the name of the methods and only record the relationship that the other answer
vectors reported by agent i have lower level than agent i’s own answer vector.
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Algorithm 1 Building Block Corr
1: procedure Corr(v1;v2) ▷ e.g. v1 = (,,∅,,,,,,), v2 = (,,,,,,,,∅)
2: if either v1 or v2 has fewer than two non-empty entries then return 0
3: else
4: B ⊂ [M]← the set of entries where both v1 and v2 are not empty ▷ B ← {1,3,4}
5: if B = ∅ then return 0
6: else
7: for tB ∈ B do ▷ We call tB a reward task
8: v1(t1)← a random non-empty entry in v1
9: ▷ v1(t1)← ,
10: v2(t2)← a random non-empty entry in v2, t2 ≠ t1 ▷ v2(t2)← ,
11: CorrtB ← 1(v1(tB) = v2(tB)) − 1(v1(t1) = v2(t2)) ▷ CorrtB ← 0
12: return ∑tB∈B CorrtB and “success” ▷ Return 0
13: procedure Corr(v1;v2∣V ) ▷ e.g. v1 = (,,,,/,,,,), v2 = (,,,,/,,,/), V = {v},
v = (,,,,/,,,/)
14: C ← the set of entries where every v ∈ V is not empty ▷ C ← {1,2,3,4,5}
15: if C = ∅ then return Corr(v1;v2)
16: else
17: t∗C ← a random element in C ▷ t∗C ← 2
18: D ← ∅
19: for t ∈ [T ] do
20: if for every v ∈ V , v(t) = v(t∗C) then
21: put t in D ▷ D = {1,2,4}, v1(D) = v2(D) = (,,,,,)
22: return Corr(v1(D);v2(D))
23: ▷ Return Corr(v1(D);v2(D)) = 0 and “success”
Learning Information Structure We define the distance between ψˆmi and ψˆ
m′
j as
1
MIf (Ψˆmi ;Ψˆm′j ) .
The mechanism starts to cluster answer vectors. A set of answer vectors are clustered into one
cluster if and only if their pairwise distance is less than δ0. A cluster may have ≥ 1 answer
vector(s).
For two clusters m1,m2, m1 ≻m2 if and only if there exists an agent who’s own answer vector
is in cluster m1 and also provides an answer vector which is classified in cluster m2. The
mechanism picks positive real values for the type payment scale αm according to a rule L.
Information Score The mechanism learns the information structure using all agents’ reports
excluding agent i. We denote the set of clusters by M−i. For each cluster m ∈ M−i, the
mechanism randomly picks an answer vector, denoted ψˆm−i, from it.
Agent i is paid her information score:
∑
m∈M−i αmMI
f({Ψˆ`i}`∈Mi ; Ψˆm−i∣{Ψˆm′−i }m′≺m,m′∈M−i)
which can be calculated accurately when the number of tasks is large.
We define α(L) ∶= {αm(L)}m as the coefficients determined by L, given that the mechanism has
access to all levels of honest answer vectors. Here the amount of information and prudent strategy
are defined by the same way in HMIP, except that the coefficients are α(L).
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Definition 4.11 (Prudent strategy in Learning-based Multi-HMIM). For each agent i, we say she
plays a prudent strategy in Learning-based Multi-HMIM(L) if she chooses to (a) perform method m∗i
such that
m∗i ∈ arg max
mi
(AOI(mi,HMIP(MIf ,{αm(L)}m)) − hi(mi)) ;
(b) report all received information honestly.
We also define potent L such that α(L) is potent in the definition in HMIP.
Definition 4.12 (Potent rule for Learning-based Multi-HMIM). Given the priors {Qm}m, we say
the rule L that determines the coefficients is potent for Learning-based Multi-HMIM(L) if givenL, for every maximal m, there exists at least two agents whose prudent strategy in Learning-based
Multi-HMIM(L) are performing method m.
Theorem 4.13. With Assumption 4.1, Learning-based multi-HMIM is dominant truthful.
Moreover, with Assumption 4.10, when the rule L is potent , Learning-based multi-HMIM is
potent , dominant truthful and will output the hierarchical information structure as well as the
maximal level(s) answer vector given that agents play prudent strategy.
Learning-based multi-HMIM can be mapped to HMIP since a large number of tasks and the
gap assumption allow the estimation of the prior and the learning of the information structure
and correct clusters. Note that even if the mechanism clusters incorrectly, the mechanism is still
dominant truthful since even each agent is paid by the mutual information between her information
and “wrong” information, the information monotonicity still incentivizes the agent to report all
information she has. Thus we do not need the gap assumption for the dominant truthfulness. With
the gap assumption, we can cluster agents correctly and use Theorem 3.7 to show the potent property.
We defer the formal proof to the appendix. Moreover, we want to emphasize that our mechanisms
work even if every agent only has a piece of correct information for the information structure.
5 Single-task Setting
In the single task setting without known prior, the literature usually assumes a common prior
assumption and follows a signal-prediction framework [29]—asking agents not only her signal but
also her prediction. To achieve truthfulness for ≥ 3 agents, Radanovic and Faltings [32] and Kong
and Schoenebeck [21] punish each agent if her predictions differ from the predictions of other agents
who report the same signals with her, and reward each agent for the accuracy of her prediction.
Therefore, for each agent, to maximize her accuracy reward, she will honestly report her predictions.
To avoid the punishment for the “inconsistency”, she will honestly report her received signals as well
because of the following commonly assumed assumption.
Assumption 5.1 (common prior and stochastic relevance). We assume that for every agent i and
j, they will have the same belief for the distribution of the signals received by other agents if and
only if they receive the same signals.
5.1 Applying HMIP in the Single-task Setting
We follow the previous “signal-prediction” framework and “punishing inconsistency” idea in the
hierarchical information case. We ask agents their received signals and predictions for different levels.
We pay each agent the accuracy of her forecasts. The high expertise agents have accurate predictions
for even high cost information reports while the low expertise agents only have accurate prediction
for low cost information. Therefore, high expertise agents will be paid more.
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Single-HMIM(PS,{αm}m)
Report (signals, predictions) Each agent i who performs method mi is asked to report her
received signals {σmi }m⪯mi and her forecast pmii for Ψmi−i . For each m ≠ mi, she is asked to
optionally report her forecast pmi for Ψ
m−i. We denote her report for her received signals as{σˆmi }m⪯mˆi and her prediction report as {pˆmi }m∈Mi where Mi is the set of methods whose
outputs are predicted by agent i.
Prediction Score We define M−i as the set of methods whose outputs are reported by an agent
who is not agent i. For each m ∈ M−i, we pick an arbitrary reference agent j ≠ i whose
performed method is higher than m and denote his report for method m’s output by σˆm.
Agent i’s prediction score is ∑m∈M−i∩Mi αmPS(σm, pˆmi ).
Information Score If there is no other agent who reports the same signals as agent i, then agent
i’s information score is 0. Otherwise, arbitrarily pick a reference agent j ≠ i from the agents
who report the same signals as agent i. Agent i’s information score is minus the inconsistency
between her prediction report and agent j’s prediction report, that is,
−⎛⎝ ∑m∈Mi∩Mj αm(PS(pˆmj , pˆmj ) − PS(pˆmj , pˆmi ))⎞⎠ .
In Single-HMIM, the payment of each agent is α ∗ Information Score + β ∗Prediction Score.
Definition 5.2 (Truthful strategy in Single-HMIM). For each agent i who performed method mi,
she plays truthful strategy if she honestly report her received signals {σmi }m⪯mi and forecast for Ψmi−i
and for each m ≠mi, either she does not report or she reports her forecast for Ψm−i honestly.
We denote pmmi as agent i’s honest forecast for Ψ
m−i given that she performs method mi.
Definition 5.3 (Amount of information in Single-HMIM). For each agent i who performs method
mi, her acquired amount of information is defined as
AOI(mi,Single-HMIM(PS,{αm}m)) ∶=∑
m
αmEQm[PS(σm, pmmi)].
Later in the proof of Theorem 5.6, we will see the amount of information is also the optimal
payment of agent i who performs method mi in Single-HMIM, given that Single-HMIM has access
to all levels of honest signals reported by other agents.
Definition 5.4 (Prudent strategy in Single-HMIM). For each agent i, we say she plays a prudent
strategy in Single-HMIM(PS,{αm}m) if she chooses to (a) perform method m∗i such that
m∗i ∈ arg max
mi
(AOI(mi,Single-HMIM(PS,{αm}m)) − hi(mi)) ;
(b) play a truthful strategy.
Definition 5.5 (Potent coefficients for Single-HMIM). Given the priors {Qm}m, we say the coeffi-
cients {αm}m are potent for Single-HMIM(PS,{αm}m) if given the coefficients {αm}m, for every
maximal m, there exists at least two agents whose prudent strategy in Single-HMIM(PS,{αm}m) is
performing method m.
Recall that a mechanism is (strictly) truthful if for each agent when she believes other agents play
a truthful strategy, she can (strictly) maximize her expected utility by playing a truthful strategy.
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Theorem 5.6. With Assumption 5.1, single-HMIM is strictly truthful; moreover, when the coeffi-
cients is potent for single-HMIM, single-HMIM is potent and strictly truthful.
The strictly truthful property follows from the common prior and stochastic relevance assumption.
The potent property follows from the definition of prudent strategy and potent coefficients. We defer
the formal proof to appendix.
6 Discussion and Future Work
Although our work is theoretical, it is not far from applications. For example, in some situations,
we could simplify the information structure by roughly dividing it into two levels where the higher
level requires more time. Then we can apply our Multi-HMIM or Single-HMIM to peer grading or
any other situations where certain agents are only given 15 seconds to grade a work and others are
expected to do a good job. We value the information conditioning on the reports provided by the
“15 seconds” agents. We could also use machine learning to obtain the lower level information.
Race, sex, and other stereotypes can be used as “cheap" signals. One possible future application
of this work is to address fairness in crowdsourcing.
There are several limitations of our mechanisms. Our Multi-HMIM requires that the hierarchy
structure of the information is common knowledge. Our key assumption, that more sophisticated
agents know the information of less sophisticated agents may not always hold, especially if the less
sophisticated agents collude to report seemingly irrelevant information (e.g., the third letter of the
third word).
Our analysis of the Learning-based HMIM requires the agents to perform an infinite number
of tasks. One future direction is having the sample complexity analysis. Our Single-HMIM still
requires a forecast report. A future direction is making the forecast report optional in some scenarios
(we might ask agents for the most common answer if they believe it is not their reported answer).
Another future direction is the information cost elicitation: tuning the coefficients of the mechanisms
such that the payment matches the actual effort required by agents.
A key future direction is to test our mechanism and explore the limitations in practice by
performing real-world experiments. This would require designing a suitable user interface.
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A Additional proofs
Fact 2.6 (Information monotonicity of proper scoring rules). Given any strictly proper scoring rule
PS,
EX,Y,ZPS(Y,Pr[Y ∣X,Z]) ≥ EX,Y PS(Y,Pr[Y ∣X]).
The equality holds if and only if Pr[Y ∣X = x,Z = z] = Pr[Y ∣X = x] for all (x, z) where Pr[X = x,Z =
z] > 0.
Proof.
EX,Y PS(Y,Pr[Y ∣X]) =∑
x,y
Pr[X = x,Y = y]PS(Y = y,Pr[Y ∣X = x])
= ∑
x,y,z
Pr[X = x,Y = y,Z = z]PS(Y = y,Pr[Y ∣X = x])
=∑
x,z
Pr[X = x,Z = z]∑
y
Pr[Y = y∣X = x,Z = z]PS(Y = y,Pr[Y ∣X = x])
=∑
x,z
Pr[X = x,Z = z]PS(Pr[Y ∣X = x,Z = z],Pr[Y ∣X = x])
≤∑
x,z
Pr[X = x,Z = z]PS(Pr[Y ∣X = x,Z = z],Pr[Y ∣X = x,Z = z])
(PS is strictly proper)= EX,Y,ZPS(Y,Pr[Y ∣X,Z])
The equality holds if and only if Pr[Y ∣X = x,Z = z] = Pr[Y ∣X = x] for all (x, z) where Pr[X =
x,Z = z] > 0 since PS is striclty proper.
Theorem 4.9. With Assumption 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, Multi-HMIM({αm}m) is truthful; moreover, when{αm}m are potent for Multi-HMIM({αm}m), Multi-HMIM({αm}m) is potent and truthful.
Proof. Since we assume all tasks are a priori similar, without loss of generality, we can assume every
agent uses the same (possibly mixed) report and (possibly mixed) effort strategy for all tasks.
Truthful We divide the proof into two parts. For each agent i, given that she believes other
agents report honestly (may not report all signals they have), we will show (1) conditioning on agent
i playing pure effort strategy, she should maximize her payment as well as the utility by playing
truthful strategy; (2) it’s better for agent i to play pure effort strategy—performing the same method
all the time—than mixed effort strategy.
Part (1). We want to show that for each agent i who always perform method mi, given other
agents honestly report their methods and signals, for each m ⪯mi, she should honestly report her
real signal ψmi to maximize her expected information score in m’s level, that is,
E[2αmCorr(ψˆmi ; ψˆm−i∣{ψˆm′−i }m′≺m].
Since we assume other agents report honestly and we have assumed that the signals agents receive
for every method are homogeneous, we replace ψˆm−i, ψˆm′−i by ψm−i,ψm′−i .
When we run algorithm 1 to calculate Corr(ψˆmi ; ψˆm−i∣{ψˆm′−i }m′≺m), in the situation the algorithm
does not return “success”—situation 0—her information score in m’s level is 0 regardless of agent
i reports for method m’s output. In the situation the algorithm returns “success”, either it runs
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Corr(ψˆmi ; ψˆm−i) and returns “success”—situation 1—or it runs Corr(ψˆmi (D); ψˆm−i(D)) and returns
“success”—situation 2.
For each task, each m, fixing agents’ choices for whether to provide a signal or ∅, the situation
which the algorithm runs in is fixed as well. We only need to consider each situation separately.
Claim A.1. Given that other agents report honestly, for each agent i who always perform mi, for
all m ⪯mi, when agent i honestly reports method m’s output, her expected information score in m’s
level per each reward task is
αmMI
tvd(Ψmi ; Ψm−i)
in situation 1;
αmMI
tvd(Ψmi ; Ψm−i∣{Ψm′−i }m′≺m)
in situation 2.
Claim A.2. Given that other agents report honestly, for each agent i, when agent i reports method
m’s output as ψˆmi , her expected information score in m’s level per each reward task is ≤
αmMI
tvd(Ψˆmi ; Ψm−i)
in situation 1;
αmMI
tvd(Ψˆmi ; Ψm−i∣{Ψm′−i }m′≺m)
in situation 2. The equality holds if Ψˆmi is positively correlated with Ψ
m−i (conditioning on {Ψm′−i }m′≺m).
Once we show the above two claims. Since
MItvd(Ψˆmi ; Ψm−i∣{Ψm′−i }m′≺m)=MItvd(fm({Ψm′i }m′⪯mi); Ψm−i∣{Ψm′−i }m′≺m)
(Agent i uses the report strategy fm to report m’s output)≤MItvd({Ψm′i }m′⪯mi ; Ψm−i∣{Ψm′−i }m′≺m) (Information Monotonicity of MIf )=MItvd(Ψmi ; Ψm−i∣{Ψm′−i }m′≺m) (Assumption 4.3)
and similarly MItvd(Ψˆmi ; Ψm−i) ≤MItvd(Ψmi ; Ψm−i). Part (1) follows immediately.
Part (2). This part is implied by the complexity of MItvd. We give a formal proof here. We
consider situation 1 here. For any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, any two methods m1,m2, if agent i perform method m1
with probability λ, method m2 with probability 1 − λ, for every m, agent i’s utility in m’s level is
less than
MItvd(Ψˆmi ; Ψm−i) − (λhi(m1) + (1 − λ)hi(m2))≤ max
fm
MItvd(fm(her received signals); Ψm−i) − (λhi(m1) + (1 − λ)hi(m2))=MItvd(f∗m(her received signals); Ψm−i) − (λhi(m1) + (1 − λ)hi(m2))
(f∗m is the optimal report strategy.)≤ λ(MItvd(f∗m({Ψm′i }m′⪯m1); Ψm−i) − hi(m1)) + (1 − λ)(MItvd(f∗m({Ψm′i }m′⪯m2); Ψm−i) − hi(m2))
(Convexity of MIf )
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≤ max{MItvd(f∗m({Ψm′i }m′⪯m1); Ψm−i) − hi(m1),MItvd(f∗m({Ψm′i }m′⪯m2); Ψm−i) − hi(m2)}
in situation 1. Without loss of generality, we assume
MItvd(f∗m({Ψm′i }m′⪯m1); Ψm−i) − hi(m1) ≥MItvd(f∗m({Ψm′i }m′⪯m2); Ψm−i) − hi(m2).
Then
MItvd(Ψˆmi ; Ψm−i) − (λhi(m1) + (1 − λ)hi(m2))≤MItvd(f∗m({Ψm′i }m′⪯m1); Ψm−i) − hi(m1)≤ max
fm
MItvd(fm({Ψm′i }m′⪯m1); Ψm−i) − hi(m1)
The analysis for situation 2 is similar. With the positively correlated guess assumption (Assump-
tion 4.5) and Claim A.2, we know maxfmMI
tvd(fm({Ψm′i }m′⪯m1); Ψm−i) can be obtained by agent
i in Multi-HMIM by always performing m1 and playing a proper report strategy. Thus, agent i
cannot obtain better utility by playing mixed effort strategy.
Potent We can follow the proof of truthful property and additionally show that when the
coefficients are potent , for each agent i, when she believes others agents play prudent strategy,
agent i should pick the effort strategy defined by the prudent strategy as her optimal effort strategy.
When the coefficients are potent , based on the definition of potent coefficients, for each agent i,
when she believe other agents play prudent strategy, for each task she finished, there must exists
another agent who finished the same task with her, using the method that is higher or equal to her.
Thus, agent i’s all tasks are reward tasks for her, and algorithm 1 will always run into situation 2
since the mechanism always has access to all levels of information. With the positively correlated
guess assumption (Assumption 4.5) and Claim A.2, agent i’s optimal utility is proportional to
∑
m∈M maxfm∶Π`⪯miΣ`↦Σm αmMItvd(fm({Ψ`i}`⪯mi); Ψm−i∣{Ψm′−i }m′≺m) − hi(mi)
by always performing method mi. Thus, agent i’s optimal effort strategy should be the effort strategy
defined by the prudent strategy, given that she believes other agents play prudent strategy.
Theorem 4.13. With Assumption 4.1, Learning based multi-HMIM is dominant truthful.
Moreover, with Assumption 4.10, when the rule L is potent , Learning based multi-HMIM is
potent , dominant truthful and will output the hierarchical information structure as well as the
maximal level(s) answer vector given that agents play prudent strategy.
Proof for Theorem 4.13. Since we assume all tasks are a priori similar, without loss of generality,
we can assume every agent use the same report and effort strategy for all tasks.
In order to show the dominant truthful property, we will show for each agent, fixing any other
agents’ strategies, (1) conditioning on using pure effort strategy, she can maximize her payment as
well as the utility by reporting her received information honestly; (2) pure effort strategy has higher
utility than mixed effort strategy.
Part (1). Even if the mechanism clusters incorrectly, part (1) still follows directly from the
information monotonicity property of f -mutual information MIf .
Part (2). The proof here is the same with the part (2) proof in Theorem 4.9. We give a formal
proof here.
For any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, any two methods m1,m2, if agent i perform method m1 with probability λ,
method m2 with probability 1 − λ, agent i’s utility in m’s level is
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MIf(her reported signals; Ψˆm−i∣{Ψˆm′−i }m′≺m,m′∈M−i) − (λhi(m1) + (1 − λ)hi(m2))≤MIf(her received signals; ; Ψˆm−i∣{Ψˆm′−i }m′≺m,m′∈M−i) − (λhi(m1) + (1 − λ)hi(m2))≤λ(MIf({Ψm′i }m′⪯m1 ; Ψˆm−i∣{Ψˆm′−i }m′≺m,m′∈M−i) − hi(m1)) (convexity of MIf )+ (1 − λ)(MIf({Ψm′i }m′⪯m2 ; Ψˆm−i∣{Ψˆm′−i }m′≺m,m′∈M−i) − hi(m2))≤max{MIf({Ψm′i }m′⪯m1 ; Ψˆm−i∣{Ψˆm′−i }m′≺m,m′∈M−i) − hi(m1),
MIf({Ψm′i }m′⪯m2 ; Ψˆm−i∣{Ψˆm′−i }m′≺m,m′∈M−i) − hi(m2)}
Thus, each agent i cannot obtain higher utility by playing a mixed effort strategy.
It remains to show the potent property. When the rule is potent , for each agent i, when she
believes other agents play prudent strategy, the mechanism must have access to all levels of honest
answer vectors due to the definition of prudent strategy and potent rule. With Assumption 4.10, the
mechanism can correctly learn the whole hierarchical information structure without agent i’s report
and use coefficients α(L). Thus, her optimal payment for performing method mi will be
∑
m∈M αmMIf({Ψ`i}`⪯mi ; Ψm−i∣{Ψm′−i }m′≺m)
due to the information monotonicity of MIf . In this case, her optimal strategy is her prudent
strategy. Therefore, learning based Multi-HMIM is potent and will output the correct hierarchical
information structure as well as the maximal level(s) answer vector(s) when agents play prudent
strategy.
Theorem 5.6. With Assumption 5.1, single-HMIM is strictly truthful; moreover, when the coeffi-
cients is potent for single-HMIM, single-HMIM is potent and strictly truthful.
for Theorem 5.6. For each agent i, her highest information score is 0. When she believes all other
agents honestly report their signals and predictions, she can obtain her highest prediction score via
providing her truthful prediction based on the property of the strictly proper scoring rule. While
during the same time, she can obtain 0 (the highest) information score according to the common
prior assumption. If agent i tell lies about her predictions, in expectation she will receive strictly
lower prediction score since PS is strictly proper. If she honestly provides her predictions but
lie for the signals, then she will be punished for her information score with positive probability.
Therefore, when agent i believes everyone else tells the truth, honestly reporting her truthful signals
and predictions strictly maximize her payment.
It remains to show the potent property. In Single-HMIM, when the coefficients are potent , for
each agent i, when she believes other agents play prudent strategy, for each m, there must exist
a reference agent for agent i who reports method m’s output. Thus agent i’s optimal expected
payment by performing method mi is
∑
m∈M αmEQm[PS(σm, pmmi)]
since her optimal information score is always 0. In this case, agent i’s optimal strategy is prudent
for her. Therefore, Single-HMIM is potent .
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Claim A.1. Given that other agents report honestly, for each agent i who always perform mi, for
all m ⪯mi, when agent i honestly reports method m’s output, her expected information score in m’s
level per each reward task is
αmMI
tvd(Ψmi ; Ψm−i)
in situation 1;
αmMI
tvd(Ψmi ; Ψm−i∣{Ψm′−i }m′≺m)
in situation 2.
Proof for Claim A.1. We first show
E[Corr(ψmi ;Ψm−i)] = 12MItvd(Ψmi ; Ψm−i).
1
2
MItvd(Ψmi ; Ψm−i) = 12 ∑σ,σ′ ∣Pr[Ψmi = σ,Ψm−i = σ′] −Pr[Ψmi = σ]Pr[Ψm−i = σ′]∣ (Definition of MItvd)= 1
2
∑
σ,σ′ 1(σ = σ′) (Pr[Ψmi = σ,Ψm−i = σ′] −Pr[Ψmi = σ]Pr[Ψm−i = σ′])+ 1(σ ≠ σ′) (Pr[Ψmi = σ]Pr[Ψm−i = σ′] −Pr[Ψmi = σ,Ψm−i = σ′]) (Assumption 4.2)=∑
σ
(Pr[Ψmi = σ,Ψm−i = σ] −Pr[Ψmi = σ]Pr[Ψm−i = σ])
(Combining like terms, Pr[E] −Pr[¬E] = 2 Pr[E] − 1)= E[Corr(ψmi ;ψm−i)] (see Algorithm 1)
To show
E[Corr(ψmi ;ψm−i∣{ψm′−i }m′≺m)] = 12MItvd(Ψmi ; Ψm−i∣{Ψm′−i }m′≺m),
we only need to replace every Pr[⋅] in the above equations by Pr[⋅∣{Ψm′−i }m′≺m = {σm′}m′≺m] with
putting ∑{σm′}m′≺m Pr[{Ψm′−i }m′≺m = {σm′}m′≺m] ahead. Note that assumption 4.2 can be applied to
this case as well.
Claim A.2. Given that other agents report honestly, for each agent i, when agent i reports method
m’s output as ψˆmi , her expected information score in m’s level per each reward task is ≤
αmMI
tvd(Ψˆmi ; Ψm−i)
in situation 1;
αmMI
tvd(Ψˆmi ; Ψm−i∣{Ψm′−i }m′≺m)
in situation 2. The equality holds if Ψˆmi is positively correlated with Ψ
m−i.
Proof for Claim A.2. The proof is similar with the proof of Claim A.1. We only need to replace Ψmi
by Ψˆmi and change the second equation to greater than, that is,
1
2
∑
σ,σ′ ∣Pr[Ψmi = σ,Ψm−i = σ′] −Pr[Ψmi = σ]Pr[Ψm−i = σ′]∣
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≥ 1
2
∑
σ,σ′ 1(σ = σ′) (Pr[Ψmi = σ,Ψm−i = σ′] −Pr[Ψmi = σ]Pr[Ψm−i = σ′])+ 1(σ ≠ σ′) (Pr[Ψmi = σ]Pr[Ψm−i = σ′] −Pr[Ψmi = σ,Ψm−i = σ′]) . (∑ ∣x∣ ≥ ∑x)
Note that the equality holds if Ψˆmi is positively correlated with Ψ
m−i. Follow the same proof of
Claim A.1, we finish the proof.
B Mutual information calculations
We show the calculations for the mutual information table.
For the length signal, since agents has no uncertainty for this signal, the mutual information
between agent i’s length signal and agent j ≠ i’s length signal will be the entropy of length signal.
Recall that we have assumed an essay has long length with probability 0.5. Thus,
MI(length; length) = 0.5 ∗ log(0.5) + 0.5 ∗ log(0.5) = 0.6931
Since an essay’s length is independent with its writing and quality, we have the mutual information
between the length signal and writing signal, quality, writing conditioning length, quality conditioning
writing and length are all zero.
Pr[Ψmwi = ,,Ψmwj = ,] = 0.5 ∗ 0.9 ∗ 0.9 + 0.5 ∗ 0.1 ∗ 0.1 = 0.41
Pr[Ψmwi = ,,Ψmwj = /] = Pr[Ψmwi = /; Ψmwj = ,] = 0.5 ∗ 0.9 ∗ 0.1 + 0.5 ∗ 0.1 ∗ 0.9 = 0.09
Pr[Ψmwi = /,Ψmwj = /] = 0.5 ∗ 0.1 ∗ 0.1 + 0.5 ∗ 0.9 ∗ 0.9 = 0.41
We can put the above joint distribution over (Ψmwi ; Ψmwj ) to the formulaMI(X;Y ) = ∑x,y Pr[X =
x,Y = y] log Pr[X=x,Y =y]Pr[X=x]Pr[Y =y] and obtain
MI(length,writing;writing)=MI(writing;writing)=MI(Ψmwi ; Ψmwj ) = 0.2218
Note that MI(writing;writing) is not the entropy of the writing signal since it is the mutual
information between different agents’ writing signals.
Similarly, we can calculate the joint distribution over (Ψmqi ,Ψmwi ,Ψmqj ,Ψmwj ) and set / = 0 and, = 1:
Pr[Ψmqi = a,Ψmwi = b,Ψmqj = c,Ψmwj = d]=0.4 ∗ 0.3a ∗ 0.71−a ∗ 0.1b ∗ 0.91−b ∗ 0.3c ∗ 0.71−c ∗ 0.1d ∗ 0.91−d
(when the essay has bad quality, bad writing:)+ 0.1 ∗ 0.3a ∗ 0.71−a ∗ 0.9b ∗ 0.11−b ∗ 0.3c ∗ 0.71−c ∗ 0.9d ∗ 0.11−d
(when the essay has bad quality, good writing:)+ 0.1 ∗ 0.7a ∗ 0.31−a ∗ 0.1b ∗ 0.91−b ∗ 0.7c ∗ 0.31−c ∗ 0.1d ∗ 0.91−d
(when the essay has good quality, bad writing:)+ 0.4 ∗ 0.7a ∗ 0.31−a ∗ 0.9b ∗ 0.11−b ∗ 0.7c ∗ 0.31−c ∗ 0.9d ∗ 0.11−d
(when the essay has good quality, good writing:)
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The fact that the length signal is independent with writing and quality will ease the calculation
a lot since we can ignore the length signal if it only shows in one side when we calculate the mutual
information. Moreover, since the length signal has no uncertainty, length|length will be a value
without uncertainty and can be ignored in the calculation of mutual information.
Aided by the calculator, we can obtain
MI(length,writing; quality)=MI(writing; quality)=MI(Ψmwi ; Ψmqj ) = 0.0185
MI(length,writing;writing∣length)=MI(writing;writing) = 0.2218;
MI(length,writing, quality;writing)=MI(quality,writing;writing)=MI(Ψmwi ,Ψmqi ; Ψmwj ) = 0.2259
MI(length,writing; quality∣writing, length)=MI(writing; quality∣writing)=MI(writing, quality;writing) −MI(writing;writing) = 0.2259 − 0.2218 = 0.0041
MI(length,writing, quality; quality)=MI(quality,writing; quality)=MI(Ψmwi ,Ψmqi ; Ψmqj ) = 0.0267
MI(length,writing, quality;writing∣length)=MI(quality,writing;writing) = 0.2259
MI(length,writing, quality; quality∣writing, length)=MI(writing, quality; quality∣writing)=MI(writing, quality; quality,writing) −MI(writing, quality;writing)=0.2374 − 0.2259 = 0.0115
MI(length,writing, quality; length,writing)
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=MI(length,writing, quality; length) +MI(length,writing, quality;writing∣length)=MI(length; length) +MI(length,writing, quality;writing∣length)=0.6931 + 0.2259 = 0.9190
MI(length,writing, quality; length,writing, quality)=MI(length,writing, quality; length) +MI(length,writing, quality;writing∣length)+MI(length,writing, quality; quality∣writing, length)=0.6931 + 0.2259 + 0.0115 = 0.9305
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